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Abstract			
This	 paper	 explores	 why	 the	 UK	 Government	 accepted	 the	 principle	 of	 a	 referendum	 on	 Scottish	
independence	 while	 the	 Spanish	 Government	 has	 continued	 to	 oppose	 a	 similar	 referendum	 in	
Catalonia.	Previous	literature	in	territorial	politics	on	these	cases	has	focused	on	the	causes	behind	the	
rise	in	independence	support	and	the	characteristics	of	the	independence	project,	but	the	issue	of	the	
different	state	responses	to	the	same	demand	has	not	received	sustained	attention.		
			
We	propose	to	fill	this	gap	by	examining	the	factors	that	explain	the	different	approaches	taken	by	the	
two	governments.	We	hypothesise	that	there	is	something	distinctly	and	significantly	different	between	
the	two	contexts	that	help	explain	the	divergence.	Drawing	on	literature	on	party	politics,	constitutional	
law,	 nationalism	 studies	 and	 citizen	 engagement,	 we	 identify	 a	 number	 of	 plausible	 factors.	 These	
include,	but	are	not	 limited	 to,	 the	 following:	different	 incentives	 created	by	party	 systems	and	party	
competition;	different	constitutions;	different	national	frames	and	understandings	of	the	political	union;	
and	supply	(autonomous	institutions)	and	demand	(public	opinion)	dynamics.	We	stress	throughout	the	
analysis	 the	normative	underpinning	of	political	principles	and	 institutional	designs.	We	 then	move	 to	
the	second	half	of	the	paper,	exploring	these	factors	as	they	are	embedded	in	the	particular	British	and	
Spanish	contexts.	The	 focus	 is	on	assessing	 the	significance	of	 the	 factors	pinpointed	by	 the	academic	
literatures	 in	 each	 of	 the	 cases.	 The	 findings	 will	 contribute	 to	 the	 understanding	 of	 the	 different	
attitudes	 adopted	 by	 the	 UK	 and	 Spanish	 Governments,	 and	 to	 expanding	 and	 refining	 theory	 in	
territorial	politics	about	state	responses	to	independence	demands.		
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Introduction		
Why	did	the	UK	Government	accept	the	principle	of	a	referendum	on	Scottish	independence	while	the	
Spanish	Government	has	continued	to	oppose	a	similar	referendum	in	Catalonia?	This	article	argues	that	
this	 variation	 can	 be	 explained	 by	 three	 main	 factors:	 the	 constitutional	 design	 relating	 to	
plurinationalism	 (incorporating	 interpretations	 of	 what	 the	 state	 and	 the	 nation	 is,	 the	 locus	 of	
sovereignty,	and	the	type	of	constitution	that	exists	in	each	case);	party	politics	(the	incentives	created	
by	the	party	system	and	the	dynamics	of	party	competition);	and	public	engagement	with	and	opinion	
on	 the	 issues	 of	 secession,	 both	 within	 the	 territory	 engaged	 in	 secessionist	 demands	 and	 beyond.		
There	has	been	a	general	assumption	among	political	commentators	that	major	difference	between	the	
two	cases	is	that	the	codified	Spanish	constitution	–	which	appears	to	forbid	self-determination	for	any	
of	its	autonomous	communities	–	is	the	primary	reason	for	this	divergence	in	approach.		While	this	is	a	
key	 facet	 of	 the	 Spanish	 Government's	 position	with	 regards	 to	 a	 Catalan	 referendum,	 and	 indeed	 a	
relevant	factor,	we	suggest	that	their	interpretation	of	the	constitution	and	the	grounds	for	their	refusal	
veers	towards	a	political	rather	than	legal	position.	
Almost	 simultaneously,	 the	 British	 Government	 formed	 by	 a	 Conservative-Liberal	 Democrat	
coalition	led	by	David	Cameron,	and	the	Spanish	Government	led	by	Mariano	Rajoy	(Popular	Party,	PP)	
faced	 demands	 for	 independence	 referendums	 in	 Scotland	 and	 Catalonia.	 The	 2011	 Scottish	 election	
delivered	a	Scottish	National	Party	(SNP)	majority	government	as	the	party	won	69	seats	out	of	129.	The	
SNP	argued	the	result	provided	a	mandate	for	an	independence	referendum	as	their	manifesto	included	
the	 commitment	 to	 bring	 forward	 an	 independence	 referendum	bill	 (SNP,	 2011:	 28).	 Evidence	 shows	
that	 increase	 in	 SNP	 support	was	 the	 result	 of	 the	 perception	 that	 the	 party	 provided	 Scotland	with	
effective	 government	 rather	 than	 an	 increase	 in	 support	 for	 independence	 (Curtice,	 2011:	 58-65).	
Despite	this,	the	election	results	paved	the	way	for	a	new	stage	of	the	constitutional	debate	in	Scotland	
focused	 on	 self-determination	 and	 independence.	 In	 2012,	 then-Catalan	 PM	 Artur	 Mas	 (then	
Convergence	 and	 Union,	 CiU)	 called	 a	 snap	 election	 and	 campaigned	 on	 the	 promise	 to	 deliver	 an	
independence	 referendum	and	 to	begin	building	 the	 structures	of	 the	 future	Catalan	 state	 (CiU	2012:	
12).	 This	 was	 a	 major	 shift	 in	 the	 traditionally	 moderate	 stance	 of	 the	 party	 on	 the	 constitutional	
question,	which	consisted	in	pushing	for	more	autonomy	while	participating	in	state-level	politics	(Barrio	
and	 Barberà,	 2011).	 Catalan	 nationalists	 claimed	 that	 the	 election	 delivered	 a	 mandate	 for	 an	
independence	 referendum	 as	 pro-referendum	 parties	 together	 achieved	 a	 comfortable	 majority.	 CiU	
and	the	pro-independence	Republican	Left	of	Catalonia	(ERC)	together	won	71	MPS,	a	majority	of	three;	
the	Catalan	greens	(IC-V),	which	also	supported	a	referendum	although	it	was	not	their	main	concern,	
obtained	13	seats;	and	the	far-left	pro-independence	CUP	obtained	3	seats	 (Martí,	2013).	The	Catalan	
parliament	 passed	 a	 ‘Declaration	 of	 Sovereignty’	 on	 23	 January	 2013.	 The	 ball	 was	 in	 the	 central	
government’s	court.		
	This	 article	 examines	 the	 different	 ways	 in	 which	 the	 British	 and	 Spanish	 Governments	
responded	to	demands	for	independence	referendums	and	seeks	to	explain	this	variation.	We	adopt	a	
contextualised	approach,	 identifying	plausible	 factors	 in	 the	 literature	and	exploring	 them	as	 they	are	
embedded	 in	 the	 specific	 British	 and	 Spanish	 contexts.	 We	 refer	 to	 ‘factors’	 rather	 than	 ‘variables’,	
implying	 that	 each	 is	 interrelated	 and	 relevant	 in	 complex	 ways	 rather	 than	 having	 an	 independent	
effect	that	can	be	identified	by	controlling	for	the	others.	Under	the	Edinburgh	Agreement,	the	Scottish	
and	British	Governments	 agreed	 to	work	 together	 to	 ensure	 that	 a	 referendum	on	 independence	 for	
Scotland	would	take	place	(Edinburgh	Agreement,	2012).	The	constitution	is	a	reserved	matter	and	the	
UK	Government	transferred	the	powers	to	hold	a	referendum	to	the	Scottish	parliament	using	a	process	
known	as	a	Section	30	Order.	By	contrast,	in	Spain	the	demand	for	a	Catalan	independence	referendum	
met	with	opposition	from	Spain’s	central	government,	a	position	supported	by	a	comfortable	majority	in	
the	Spanish	Parliament.		
	 	 	
	
	 3	 	
	
This	 article	 hopes	 to	 contribute	 to	 the	 understanding	 of	 the	 different	 reactions	 to	 self-
determination	 demands	 in	 the	 UK	 and	 Spain.	More	 generally,	 it	 aims	 at	 bringing	 new	 insights	 about	
state	 responses	 to	 self-determination	 demands.	 The	 next	 section	 examines	 the	 variation	 in	 the	
responses	given	by	the	UK	and	Spanish	Governments	and	the	political	dynamics	that	unfolded.	In	formal	
terms,	 this	 is	 our	explanandum.	 Section	 two	 draws	 on	 scholarship	 on	 constitutional	 law,	 nationalism,	
and	 territorial	 politics	 to	 identify	 plausible	 factors	 that	 might	 explain	 the	 variation.	 Section	 three	
explores	 these	 factors	 as	 they	 are	 embedded	 in	 the	 particular	 British	 and	 Spanish	 contexts.	 Our	
explanans	are	the	politics	of	the	constitution;	the	incentives	of	party	system	and	party	competition;	and	
public	 opinion.	 We	 cast	 doubt	 on	 explanations	 focusing	 exclusively	 on	 the	 different	 constitutional	
designs	 of	 Spain	 and	 UK	 and	 draw	 attention	 to	 the	 political	 and	 national	 views	 that	 underpin	
constitutional	interpretations	and	precepts,	among	other	factors.		
			
Governmental	Reactions	to	Self-Determination	Demands		
			
Spain			
The	 Spanish	Government	 have	 consistently	maintained	 that	 there	 cannot	 be	 a	 Catalan	 independence	
referendum.	The	dominant	argument	 is	that	the	Spanish	constitution	enshrines	the	 indivisibility	of	the	
Spanish	nation	and	establishes	that	national	sovereignty	belongs	to	the	Spanish	people	as	a	whole.	As	a	
result,	even	if	there	were	to	be	a	referendum,	the	franchise	should	extend	across	the	whole	of	Spain	and	
not	be	limited	to	Catalonia.	A	Catalan	referendum	would	be	‘an	illegal	act’	and	a	‘violation’	of	national	
sovereignty,	 according	 to	 Spanish	 PM	 Mariano	 Rajoy	 (Calleja,	 2017).	 In	 its	 2015	 manifesto,	 the	 PP	
stressed	 that	 ‘the	unity	of	 the	 Spanish	nation	 is	 the	principle	 grounding	our	democracy’	 and	 that	 the	
party	‘guarantees	and	will	always	guarantee	that	neither	Spain	nor	our	national	sovereignty	be	chopped’	
(PP,	2015:	7).	Facing	demands	from	Catalonia	to	respect	‘the	democratic	right	to	decide	of	Catalans’,	the	
Spanish	 Government’s	 answer	 consisted	 of	 equating	 law-enforcement	 with	 democracy.	 Indeed,	 the	
Spanish	Vice-President	Soraya	Sáenz	de	Santamaría	has	repeatedly	argued	that	 there	 is	no	democracy	
beyond	the	law	(EFE,	2014).	The	Spanish	government	explicitly	rejected	the	Scottish	precedent	precisely	
on	the	grounds	that	Spain	has	a	written	constitution	that	affirms	the	unity	of	Spain.		
	The	focus	on	the	unconstitutionality	of	a	Catalan	referendum	and	the	need	to	obey	the	law	is	
complemented	with	 references	 to	 the	 dramatic	 consequences	 of	 independence	 itself.	 Prime	Minister	
Rajoy	and	 the	Spanish	Government	have	argued	 that	Catalan	 independence	would	be	detrimental	 for	
Catalans	 as	 it	 would	 imply	 the	 exit	 from	 the	 European	 Union,	 the	 common	 market,	 and	 the	 Euro	
(Rodríguez,	 2017).	 There	 have	 also	 been	 calls	 for	 preserving	 the	 emotional	 and	 cultural	 ties	 binding	
Catalans	and	 the	 rest	of	 Spaniards	after	 centuries	of	 living	 together.	 These	 calls	 are	 connected	 to	 the	
pride	of	being	Spanish,	partly	grounded	on	the	claim	that	Spain	is	the	oldest	nation	in	Europe	(Moncloa,	
2017).		
	The	Spanish	Government’s	position	is	shared	by	all	state-wide	parties	except	the	leftist	coalition	
Unidos	 Podemos	 (Together	 We	 Can).	 This	 coalition	 is	 formed	 by	 Podemos,	 United	 Left,	 and	 smaller	
parties.	 In	April	2014,	a	delegation	of	the	Catalan	Parliament	formally	asked	the	Spanish	Parliament	to	
transfer	the	powers	to	hold	a	legal	referendum	to	Catalonia,	a	demand	that	echoed	the	mechanism	used	
by	 the	 UK	 Government	 to	 transfer	 the	 competence	 to	 the	 Scottish	 Parliament.	 Under	 the	 current	
Spanish	 constitution,	 referendums	 can	 only	 be	 called	 by	 the	 central	 government	 in	 Madrid.	 An	
overwhelming	majority	of	Spanish	MPs	voted	against	it,	 including	the	main	opposition	Socialist	party	–
PSOE	 (Martí	 and	 Cetrà,	 2016:	 108).	 After	 the	 2015	 Spanish	 election,	 one	 of	 the	main	 reasons	why	 a	
leftist	 coalition	 between	 Podemos	 and	 PSOE	 with	 the	 external	 support	 of	 other	 parties	 did	 not	
materialise	is	that	Podemos	established	the	holding	of	a	Catalan	independence	referendum	as	a	sine	qua	
non	requirement	to	form	a	government,	while	the	PSOE	opposed	such	a	referendum.	More	recently,	the	
party	 has	 attempted	 to	 tone	 down	 his	 position	 (Rodríguez-Teruel,	 Barrio	 and	 Barberà,	 2016:	 13).	 In	
	 	 	
	
	 4	 	
	
September	2016	there	was	a	successful	internal	revolt	within	the	PSOE	to	remove	Pedro	Sánchez	from	
his	position	as	the	party’s	General	Secretary.	Members	of	the	party	board	justified	this	move	due	to	the	
party’s	poor	results	in	the	2015	and	2016	Spanish	elections	(Medina	and	Correa,	2016;	Simón,	2016).	It	
was	 also	 justified	 as	 a	 result	 of	 an	 agreement	 between	 the	 pro-independence	 Republican	 Left	 of	
Catalonia	(ERC)	and	Podemos,	brokered	by	Sánchez,	which	was	seen	as	unacceptable	by	the	wider	party	
(Moreno,	2017).		
The	strategy	of	the	Spanish	Government	has	been	to	resort	to	challenges	via	the	Constitutional	
Court.	In	September	2014	the	Catalan	Parliament	passed	a	law	on	popular	consultations	to	hold	a	non-
binding	 independence	vote	on	9	November	2014.	The	Spanish	Government	 challenged	 the	 law	 in	 the	
Court,	which	 ruled	 the	 vote	 illegal	 five	 days	 before	 it	was	held.	However,	 the	Government	ultimately	
tolerated	 the	vote	when	 the	Catalan	Government	 called	 it	on	 the	basis	of	article	40.2,	which	had	not	
been	 appealed	 by	 the	 Spanish	 government.	 The	 vote,	 which	 came	 to	 be	 known	 as	 the	 ‘participation	
process’,	was	more	an	act	of	protest	by	the	pro-independence	side	than	a	decisive	test	on	independence	
as	it	was	boycotted	by	most	unionists	(Liñeira	and	Cetrà,	2015:	263).	In	March	2017,	then-PM	Artur	Mas	
was	found	guilty	by	Catalonia’s	High	Court	of	disobeying	the	Spanish	Constitutional	Court	and	was	fined	
and	banned	from	holding	public	office	for	two	years	(García,	2017).	Three	other	members	of	the	Catalan	
Government	were	 also	 found	 guilty.	 The	 President	 of	 the	Catalan	 Parliament,	 Carme	 Forcadell,	 faced	
charges	of	neglect	of	duty	and	contempt	of	 court	 for	allowing	 the	pro-independence	 'roadmap'	 to	be	
put	to	a	vote	in	July	2016.		
	Partly	as	a	result	of	the	Spanish	Government’s	unaltered	position,	there	was	a	progressive	shift	
in	 the	 strategic	 goal	 and	discursive	 focus	of	 the	pro-independence	 camp.	The	 initial	 emphasis	on	 ‘the	
right	to	decide’	and	the	demand	for	a	negotiated	referendum	was	progressively	replaced	with	the	goal	
of	 independence.	 This	 enhanced	 divisions	 within	 the	 pro-independence	 camp.	 First,	 after	 the	 2014	
‘participation	 process’	 there	 were	 public	 disagreements	 between	 CDC	 (Democratic	 Convergence	 of	
Catalonia)	and	ERC	about	the	next	step.	Second,	 the	 ‘plebiscitary	elections’	 in	November	2015	set	the	
far-left	 pro-independence	CUP	as	 kingmaker	 as	 the	Together	 for	 Yes	 (JxS)	 pro-independence	 coalition	
fell	 short	 of	 a	 majority	 (Martí	 and	 Cetrà,	 2016).	 The	 CUP	 vetoed	 Mas’s	 candidacy	 due	 to	 profound	
ideological	disagreements,	thus	fulfilling	their	electoral	promise	of	not	re-electing	him	as	president.	JxS	
and	the	CUP	struck	a	deal	the	day	before	the	deadline	which	allowed	CDC	to	keep	the	presidency	with	
Carles	 Puigdemont	while	 the	 CUP	 secured	 a	 parliamentary	majority	 for	 JxS.	 Third,	 JxS	 and	 CUP	 have	
different	 views	 on	 the	 best	 strategy	 to	 achieve	 independence,	 with	 the	 latter	 defending	 an	 open	
confrontation	and	challenge	with	the	state.		
Another	consequence	of	the	shift	from	self-determination	to	independence	was	create	tensions	
between	 the	parties	 supporting	 the	principle	of	 a	 referendum	but	not	 necessarily	 independence,	 and	
those	who	supported	 independence	outright.	This	 is	 the	case	with	 regards	 to	 the	Catalan	Greens	and	
Podemos,	currently	under	the	coalition	Catalunya	Sí	Que	Es	Pot	 (Catalonia	Yes	We	Can).	This,	together	
with	 the	 excessive	 difficulties	 of	 achieving	 unilateral	 independence,	may	 have	 influenced	 the	 Catalan	
Government’s	recent	decision	to	shift	back	the	focus	to	the	demand	for	a	referendum.	Catalan	President	
Carles	Puigdemont	announced	a	binding	 referendum	 in	September	2017	while	 insisting	 that	he	 is	 still	
open	 to	 dialogue	 with	 the	 Spanish	 Government	 (Roger	 and	 Pruna,	 2016).	 In	 April	 2017	 the	 Spanish	
Government	 challenged	 the	 Catalan	 draft	 budget	 in	 the	 Constitutional	 Court	 for	 including	 an	 item	 to	
cover	 the	 costs	 of	 the	 referendum,	 which	 automatically	 suspended	 it	 until	 the	 Court’s	 ruling	 will	 be	
issued.	The	political	deadlock	remains.			
		
The	UK			
In	 contrast	 with	 the	 more	 absolutist	 position	 of	 the	 Spanish	 Government,	 the	 UK	 Government	 has	
adopted	 a	 more	 permissive	 strategy	 with	 regards	 to	 demands	 for	 a	 referendum	 on	 independence,	
allowing	the	Scottish	Parliament	to	organise	and	hold	such	a	vote	in	2014	and	respect	the	outcome.	The	
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caveat	here	is	that	this	position	appears	to	have	changed	recently,	a	point	to	which	we	will	return	later.	
Nevertheless,	 the	 relationship	 between	 the	 UK	 Government	 and	 Parliament	 at	Westminster	 and	 the	
devolved	 institution	at	Holyrood	 in	Edinburgh	 in	 relation	 to	 the	 constitutional	question	appears	 to	be	
much	more	flexible	than	that	of	their	Spanish	counterparts.		
Devolution	to	Scotland	was	a	reaction	to	a	clear	demand	for	some	form	of	self-government.	The	
establishment	of	a	Scottish	Parliament	was	not	seen	as	a	threat	to	the	Union	but	as	a	means	of	securing	
its	 continued	 existence.	 George	 (now	 Lord)	 Robertson,	 then	 Shadow	 Secretary	 of	 State	 for	 Scotland,	
proclaimed	that	devolution	would	“kill	nationalism	stone	dead"	(Harvey,	2015:	15).	Besides	which,	the	
SNP	 in	 1997	were	not	 considered	 a	 threat	 to	 the	 Labour	 party’s	 hegemonic	 position	 in	 Scotland.	 The	
contrast	with	Catalonia	is	clear	here.	Since	the	establishment	of	the	Catalan	autonomous	community	in	
1980,	 each	 election	 has	 seen	 Catalan	 nationalists	 emerge	 as	 the	 largest	 party,	 and	 the	 very	
establishment	 of	 these	 institutions	 was	 tied	 to	 the	 process	 of	 democratization,	 a	 process	 which	 the	
nationalists	 had	 played	 a	 significant	 role	 in.	 In	 Scotland	 and	 the	 UK,	 the	 nationalists	 had	 not	 been	
involved	 in	these	processes	and	were	not	 in	a	position	–	 in	the	 initial	years	of	devolution	–	to	govern.	
What	also	stands	in	stark	contrast	is	the	apparent	rigidity	of	the	Spanish	constitution,	which	establishes	
the	‘indivisible	unity’	of	the	Spanish	nation	and	appears	to	prohibit	a	referendum	on	that	very	subject.	
Not	so	in	the	UK,	where	the	position	is	much	more	ambiguous,	and	constitutional	change	occurs	more	
frequently	 and	 in	 an	 ad	 hoc	manner,	 based	 predominantly	 on	 precedent	 and	 convention	 (Bogdanor,	
1999).	Thus,	when	the	SNP	won	a	minority	government	in	2007,	and	subsequently	a	majority	in	the	2011	
Scottish	Parliament	election,	they	did	so	with	the	express	intention	(as	indicated	in	election	manifestos	
and	 numerous	 public	 statements	 while	 in	 office)	 of	 holding	 a	 referendum	 on	 independence.	 The	 UK	
Government,	 guided	 in	 part	 by	opinion	polls	which	 suggested	 that	 the	option	of	 remaining	 in	 the	UK	
would	 prevail	 handsomely,	 goaded	 the	 SNP	 into	 declaring	 a	 referendum.	 This	 was	 ostensibly	 a	 high	
stakes	poker	game:	 the	UK	Government	believed	 that	 their	 victory	would	be	 significant,	 and	 that	 this	
would	end	discussion	of	further	constitutional	change	for	the	foreseeable	future.		
		As	 a	 result,	 a	 referendum	 was	 organised	 with	 the	 full	 support	 of	 the	 Conservative-Liberal	
Democrat	UK	Government,	with	the	rules	governing	its	operation	outlined	in	a	document	which	became	
known	 as	 the	 Edinburgh	 Agreement.	 Between	 the	 two	 governments,	 decisions	were	made	 upon	 the	
franchise	for	the	referendum,	the	number	of	options	and	questions	allowed	on	the	ballot	and	a	deadline	
by	which	the	vote	had	to	be	held.	With	a	turnout	of	84.6%,	the	referendum	engaged	the	population	at	a	
record	 level	 for	 an	 election	 or	 referendum	 under	 universal	 suffrage.	 Prime	 Minister	 David	 Cameron	
made	regular	interventions	in	the	debate,	emphasising	his	family	belong	to	clan	Cameron,	whose	motto	
'let	us	unite'	played	explicitly	to	his	argument	in	favour	of	the	Union.	The	phrase	'One	Nation'	was	used	
over	 twenty	 times	 by	 then-opposition	 leader	 Ed	Miliband	 in	 a	 conference	 speech	 –	 ostensibly	 in	 an	
economic	sense,	but	with	reference	to	the	Scottish	debate	too.	Former	Prime	Minister	Gordon	Brown,	
and	the	current	holder	of	that	office	Theresa	May	made	reference	to	the	UK	as	a	'family	of	nations'	and	
a	'Union	of	nations',	emphasising	unity	despite	differences	in	identity.	The	outcome	–	the	defeat	of	the	
independence	 proposal	 by	 55.3%-44.7%	 –	 saw	 just	 over	 2	 million	 people	 vote	 to	 remain	 in	 the	 UK,	
against	1.6	million	who	voted	to	leave.	Nevertheless,	the	UK	General	Election	in	May	2015	strengthened	
the	SNP’s	hand	on	the	constitutional	question	after	the	party’s	remarkable	performance.	While	in	2010	
the	party	had	secured	6	seats	in	constituencies	which	had	historically	seen	high	support,	in	2015	the	SNP	
returned	56	of	Scotland’s	59	MPs,	 reducing	Labour,	 the	Conservatives	and	 the	Liberal	Democrats	 to	a	
solitary	Scottish	seat	each.				
		The	2016	Scottish	Parliament	election	saw	the	SNP	returned	to	government	in	Scotland,	albeit	
as	 a	 minority.	 However,	 the	 increase	 in	 seats	 for	 the	 Scottish	 Greens	 has	 maintained	 a	 pro-
independence	majority	among	MSPs.	The	UK	Government	–	after	2015,	a	Conservative	majority	–	has	
sought	to	dampen	support	for	independence	by	further	extending	autonomy	to	the	Scottish	Parliament.	
The	 taxation	 provisions	 of	 the	 Scotland	 Act	 2012	 were	 enacted	 after	 the	 2016	 election,	 and	 further	
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powers	were	devolved	 in	 the	 aftermath	of	 the	 independence	 referendum	and	 the	 Smith	Commission	
process.	 It	 is	 clear	 that	 the	 UK	 Government’s	 intention	 on	 the	 constitutional	 issue	 is	 to	 seek	 to	
accommodate	 demands	 for	 further	 autonomy	 within	 the	 framework	 of	 devolution	 and	 to	 allow	 the	
Scottish	Parliament	the	opportunity	to	legislate	freely	within	its	areas	of	competence.	However,	 in	the	
wake	of	the	EU	referendum	vote	in	which	Scotland’s	vote	to	remain	has	been	overruled	by	the	UK-wide	
vote	to	leave,	the	Scottish	First	Minister	Nicola	Sturgeon	has	indicated	her	intention	to	begin	a	process	
that	would	allow	Scotland	to	hold	a	second	independence	referendum	by	the	end	of	Spring	2019.	The	
UK	 Prime	 Minister	 Theresa	 May	 has	 responded	 by	 saying	 “now	 is	 not	 the	 time”	 for	 a	 second	
referendum,	 implying	 that	 consent	 for	 a	 referendum	 would	 not	 be	 withheld	 indefinitely,	 but	 that	
consent	would	 not	 be	 forthcoming	 in	 short	 order.	Nevertheless,	 the	 Scottish	 Parliament	 has	 given	 its	
backing	for	a	Section	30	Order,	which	would	temporarily	transfer	the	power	to	hold	a	referendum	to	the	
Scottish	Parliament	–	as	it	did	in	2014	–	meaning	that	the	UK	Government	will	now	have	a	decision	to	
make	as	to	what	strategy	it	intends	to	pursue.		
			
Factors	Explaining	the	Variation			
	
The	Constitutional	Politics	of	Nationalism	
The	arguments	provided	by	 the	Spanish	Government	 in	 relation	 to	 the	Catalan	question	points	 to	 the	
relevance	of	 the	constitutional	design.	The	variation	 in	 the	 responses	of	 the	 two	central	governments	
might	 be	 explained	 with	 reference	 to	 the	 fact	 that	 the	 Spanish	 written	 constitution	 clearly	 prohibits	
independence,	 while	 the	 UK	 lacks	 a	 codified	 constitution	 which	 allows	 for	 a	 much	 more	 flexible	
constitutional	 practice.	 In	 this	 paper,	 we	 cast	 doubt	 on	 this	 view.	 We	 emphasise	 that	 constitutions	
codify,	rather	than	transcend,	nationalism,	and	therefore	explicitly	legal	arguments	such	as	those	of	the	
Spanish	 Government	 are	 also	 political	 arguments	 comprising	 more	 or	 less	 implicit	 views	 over	
nationhood	 and	 sovereignty.	 We	 also	 stress	 that	 there	 are	 multiple	 interpretations	 available	 of	 the	
Spanish	constitution.		
Drawing	 on	 scholarship	 in	 constitutional	 law	 (Tierney,	 2004;	Walker,	 2016),	we	 identify	 three	
relevant	 constitutional	 factors	 through	which	we	 can	 appraise	 the	 two	 cases.	 The	 first	 is	 the	national	
conception	of	 the	 state.	 By	 this	we	mean	whether	 the	 Spanish	 and	 the	UK	 constitutional	 designs	 and	
praxis	 display	 a	 mononational	 or	 plurinational	 view	 of	 the	 state.	 The	 second	 factor	 is	 related	 and	
consists	of	the	locus	of	sovereignty.	This	refers	to	whether	it	is	legal	for	Catalonia	and	Scotland	to	hold	
independence	referendums.	The	third	is	the	type	of	constitution.	By	this	we	mean	whether	it	is	codified	
or	non-codified,	and	whether	its	reform	process	is	considered	rigid	or	flexible.		
Plurinational	states	represent	a	challenge	to	the	monistic	approach	to	 liberal	constitutionalism	
(Tierney,	2004;	Requejo,	2010).	This	approach	presupposes	the	existence	of	only	one	people	within	the	
state	and	presumes	the	liberal	democratic	state	to	be	neutral	in	national	and	cultural	terms.	The	claim	
by	 minority	 nationalists	 that	 the	 state	 encompasses	 different	 peoples	 puts	 into	 question	 unitary	
concepts	of	sovereignty	and	‘narrow	formalisms	which	hope	to	freeze	constitutional	meaning	within	the	
frame	of	the	dominant	position’	(Tierney,	2004:	15).	There	is	a	set	of	institutional	repertoires	that	states	
can	 choose	 from	 when	 seeking	 to	 manage	 plurinationalism	 within	 its	 borders,	 including	 symbolic	
recognition,	 which	 assumes	 that	 state-wide	 political	 elites	 are	 willing	 to	 identify	 the	 state	 as	
plurinational	 (Swenden,	 2013).	 We	 expect	 factors	 around	 the	 recognition	 of	 plurinationalism	 or	
otherwise	to	be	relevant	in	explaining	the	responses	given	by	the	British	and	Spanish	Governments.	We	
expect	 the	 recognition	of	 these	 territories	as	nations	 to	be	necessary	but	not	 sufficient	conditions	 for	
the	holding	of	an	independence	referendum.		
In	 relation	 to	 the	 assumption	 of	 state	 neutrality,	 nationalism	 scholars	 and	 liberal	 nationalist	
theorists	 have	 persuasively	 argued	 that	 nationhood	 is	 pervasively	 institutionalised	 in	 the	 practice	 of	
liberal	democracies	 (Dickhoff,	2016;	Hearn,	2006;	Kymlicka,	1995;	2001).	Bernard	Yack’s	notion	of	 the	
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‘myth	of	the	civic	nation’	captures	this	point	(Yack,	2012:	23-43).	He	notes	that	liberal	constitutions	do	
not	 only	 stipulate	 the	moral	 and	 political	 principles	 that	must	 rule	 the	 living	 together	 of	 a	 particular	
political	community,	but	it	also	includes	cultural	elements	and	connections	with	pre-political	identities.	
Mariano	Rajoy’s	references	to	centuries	of	living	together	within	the	Spanish	nation	are	a	case	in	point.	
The	myth	of	civic	nations	as	voluntary	associations	for	the	expression	of	shared	political	principles	fails	
to	explain	why	loyalty	and	attachment	are	supposed	to	bind	individuals	to	their	particular	nation	rather	
than	 to	 any	other	 one	whose	 constitution	 supports	 the	 same	principles.	 Because	 liberal	 constitutions	
codify	 rather	 than	 transcend	 particular	 national	 and	 cultural	 frames	 of	 reference,	 tensions	 within	
plurinational	 states	 are	 more	 fruitfully	 understood	 as	 the	 result	 of	 competing	 national	 projects.	 The	
extent	 to	which	 the	 centre	 contributes	 –	 and	 accepts	 challenges	 –	 to	 nation	 building	may	 also	 be	 an	
important	explanatory	factor.		
Another	 challenge	 posed	 by	 minority	 nationalism	 is	 in	 relation	 to	 the	 principle	 of	 self-
determination.	Claims	by	minority	nationalists	carry	with	them	a	more	or	 less	explicit	assertion	of	 the	
right	 to	 self-determination,	 presented	 as	 part	 of	 the	 normative	 content	 of	 nationality	 (Keating	 2001).	
The	specific	claim	is	that	the	nation	is	the	subject	of	self-determination	and	it	has	the	right	to	determine	
its	future.	The	emerging	notion	of	the	‘right	to	decide’	in	the	Catalan	context	captures	well	this	principle,	
although	 this	 is	 a	 more	 vague	 formulation	 that	 aims	 at	 stressing	 the	 democratic	 foundations	 of	 the	
demand.	The	principle	of	self-determination	sits	uneasily	with	unitary	concepts	of	sovereignty	and	puts	
into	question	the	legitimacy	of	state	borders.	International	and	European	law	do	not	recognise	a	right	to	
self-determination,	and	there	is	an	unresolved	debate	in	scholarship	within	liberal	political	theory	over	
the	 conditions	 that	 make	 self-determination	 legitimate	 (Moore,	 1998).	 While	 we	 recognise	 the	
relevance	of	these	normative	debates,	themselves	an	abstraction	from	real-world	dilemmas,	we	expect	
them	to	be	less	central	in	explaining	the	responses	given	by	the	two	central	governments.	If	we	accept	
the	view	–	widely	held	in	international	relations	theory	–	that	states	are	primarily	concerned	with	self-
preservation	 (Hobbes,	 1996	 [1651])	 then	 any	 referendum	 that	might	 threaten	 the	 boundaries	 of	 the	
state	 should	not	be	undertaken.	 This	 is	where	 issues	within	 international	 law	around	 the	 concepts	of	
sovereignty	and	the	primacy	of	states	on	the	one	hand,	and	respect	for	democratic	processes	and	the	
principle	of	self-determination	on	the	other	come	into	conflict.		
Historic	 claims	 to	 respect	 the	 right	 to	 self-determination	date	 from	Woodrow	Wilson	and	 the	
League	of	Nations,	but	as	a	principle	of	 international	relations,	this	has	been	balanced	by	the	fact	that	
states	 remain	 the	 primary	 actors	 in	 global	 politics,	 and	 as	 a	 result,	 the	 territorial	 integrity	 of	 existing	
states	has	tended	to	take	priority.	Although	central	governments	tend	to	avoid	grandiose	claims	about	
territorial	 integrity	 and	 preservation	 of	 borders	 when	 dealing	 with	 internal	 territorial	 claims,	
undoubtedly	 these	 issues	 of	 ‘high	 politics’	 play	 a	 role	 in	 guiding	 their	 actions.	 The	 process	 of	
globalization	 has	 weakened	 the	 power	 of	 the	 state,	 introducing	 a	 supranational	 level	 of	 state	
interactions	 through	 international	 institutions.	 At	 the	 same	 time,	 regional	 actors	 have	 increased	
demands	for	autonomy,	seeking	opportunities	to	participate	in	global	markets,	threatening	the	primacy	
of	the	state	from	below.	As	a	result,	states	have	had	to	learn,	in	practice,	to	share	sovereignty,	both	by	
ceding	 control	 of	 issues	 in	 the	 international	 realm	 to	 supranational	 bodies	 and,	 crucially,	 by	
decentralising	 within	 the	 state	 and	 allowing	 regional	 actors	 to	 determine	 policy	 within	 their	 own	
territories.	Globalization	 and	 decentralization	 then,	 are	 two	 sides	 of	 the	 same	 coin	when	 it	 comes	 to	
diminishing	 the	 power	 of	 central	 government	 and	 emboldening	 other	 political	 actors.	 How	 a	 central	
government	reacts	to	both	of	these	 issues	–	 in	particular,	 the	historic	relationship	the	centre	has	with	
the	 concept	 of	 sovereignty	 –	 may	 be	 crucial	 in	 understanding	 whether	 a	 state	 may	 be	 willing	 to	
accommodate	demands	for	a	secession	referendum.		
		
Public	Opinion	
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Beyond	elite	level	discussions	of	sovereignty,	self-determination	and	constitutional	competences,	public	
opinion	and	engagement	with	 the	 issue	may	also	be	a	 significant	variable	 in	 considering	 the	different	
responses	 from	 the	 central	 governments.	 The	 demand	 for,	 and	 the	 participation	 in,	 constitutional	
referendums	 (sanctioned	 and	 un-sanctioned)	 emphasised	 that	 different	 methods	 of	 ‘doing’	 formal	
politics	can	achieve	broader	public	participation.	 It	 is	not	 that	 the	public	are	entirely	disengaged	 from	
politics	(though	this	does	appear	to	be	a	trend	–	see	Hay,	2007	and	Flinders,	2012)	but	that	the	methods	
utilised	and	the	expectations	that	they	have	of	these	methods	lead	to	a	negative	view	of	the	extent	to	
which	their	participation	matters.	Referendums	are	the	clearest	examples	of	direct	democracy	in	use	in	
contemporary	 representative	democracies,	and	their	use	has	become	widespread	 (Butler	and	Ranney,	
1994).	For	some,	this	increase	in	use	can	be	explained	with	reference	to	the	negative	role	of	the	people	
in	representative	democracies	–	that	is,	the	power	of	the	people	is	limited	to	selecting	and	de-selecting	
their	preferred	representatives	 in	elections	 (Bogdanor,	1994).	For	others,	 it	 is	a	question	of	 increasing	
the	 legitimacy	 of	 a	 particular	 course	 of	 action	 –	 if	 the	 people	 vote	 for	 it,	 it	 appears	 to	 have	 more	
legitimacy	 (Papadopoulous,	 2001).	 However,	 Chambers	 argues	 that	 the	 polarisation	 of	 debate	 in	
referendums	 and	 the	 inevitability	 of	 majoritarian	 outcomes	 actually	 “derails	 deliberation	 and,	 in	 so	
doing,	 undermines	 the	 legitimacy	 of	 outcomes”.	 Indeed,	 this	 goes	 as	 far	 as	 seeing	 voting	 in	 a	
referendum	as	“final”	and	citing	referendums	as	a	“zero-sum	game”	(Chambers,	2001:	240-5).	Tierney	
(2012)	 points	 out	 that	 referendums	 in	 the	 context	 of	 representative	 democracies	 are	 problematic,	
potentially	anti-democratic,	and	may	not	be	the	most	appropriate	means	of	directly	engaging	the	public	
in	political	(and	especially,	constitutional)	discussions.	Deliberation	of	the	issues	related	to	constitutional	
questions	 creates	 a	 demand	 for	 information,	 requiring	 political	 actors	 to	 turn	 to	 activism,	 and	
electorates	to	be	more	active	in	seeking	out	information.		
Alongside	engagement,	 the	views	of	 the	public	–	both	within	and	outwith	 the	 region	claiming	
self-determination	–	may	also	play	a	role.	In	the	case	of	the	former,	the	central	government	may	accede	
to	demands	for	a	referendum	on	secession	if	it	perceives	that	the	demand	for	such	a	referendum	exists	
but	 that	 support	 for	 secession	 itself	 is	 not	 sufficient	 to	 allow	 the	 region	 to	 secede.	 This	 represents	 a	
calculated	risk	on	the	part	of	the	central	government:	referendums	are	often	seen	as	an	opportunity	to	
punish	a	sitting	government,	and	frequently	the	electorate	make	these	opportunities	into	a	judgement	
on	 the	 success	 or	 failure	 of	 the	 government	 itself,	 rather	 than	 the	 issue	 at	 stake	 (Qvortrup,	 2005).	
Nevertheless,	if	opinion	polls	suggest	that	the	status	quo	is	the	preferred	option	of	the	public	within	the	
secessionist	region,	especially	if	that	is	by	a	significant	margin,	the	central	government	may	see	this	as	
an	opportunity	to	strengthen	their	case	against	secession,	deliver	a	blow	against	those	campaigning	for	
secession,	and	move	the	issue	off	the	political	agenda.	A	calculated	risk,	but	one	in	which	the	potential	
rewards	are	significant.	In	the	case	of	the	latter,	public	opinion	beyond	the	region	might	also	be	taken	
into	account.	Here,	these	views	are	likely	to	focus	on	the	historic	unity	of	the	state,	emotional	claims	of	
connectivity,	 and	 pragmatic	 considerations	 such	 as	 whether	 the	 secessionist	 region	 contributes	 a	
significant	 economic	 advantage	 to	 the	 rest	 of	 the	 state,	 or	 whether	 it	 is	 seen	 to	 be	 a	 drain	 on	 the	
centre’s	 finances.	Other	 factors,	 such	as	public	acceptance	or	 rejection	of	 the	notion	 that	a	particular	
region	has	a	‘right’	to	hold	a	referendum,	or	whether	the	electorate	in	the	rest	of	the	state	should	also	
have	a	say	in	the	potential	reorganisation	of	the	state,	might	also	be	considered.		
	
Party	Politics	
Party	 politics	 plays	 a	 significant	 role	 here	 too.	 Political	 elites	 are	 the	 ones	 responsible	 for	 managing	
minority	 nationalist	 demands	 and	 establishing	 and	 modifying	 constitutional	 arrangements	 aimed	 at	
address	them.	Drawing	on	scholarship	in	territorial	politics	(Meguid	2008,	Toubeau	and	Massetti	2013,	
Verge	2013),	we	identify	two	relevant	and	interrelated	factors	through	which	we	can	appraise	the	two	
cases.	The	 first	are	 the	strategic	calculations	of	 the	ruling	elites	vis-à-vis	 the	 incentives	created	by	 the	
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party	system.	The	second	are	the	strategic	calculations	created	by	the	dynamics	of	party	competition.	
Political	 elites	make	 decisions	 following	 a	 set	 of	 interests	 and	 objectives,	 and	 here	we	 focus	 on	 their	
electoral	 logic	of	action	(Toubeau	and	Massetti,	2013:	302).	This	 logic	 is	driven	by	the	vote	and	office-
seeking	goals	of	parties,	and	the	point	here	is	that	the	positions	of	the	two	central	governments	reflect	
strategies	that	seek	to	maintain	their	dominant	position	in	their	party	systems	vis-à-vis	the	pressures	of	
party	competition.	 In	 relation	 to	strategic	 incentives,	Meguid	 (2008)	suggested	 that	state-wide	parties	
threatened	 by	 regionalist	 parties	 will	 respond	 by	 accommodating	 their	 demands	 to	 undermine	
regionalist	parties’	ownership	of	 the	 issue	and	 to	maximise	 their	 share	of	 the	vote.	Conversely,	 state-
wide	parties	not	threatened	by	regionalist	parties	may	adopt	an	adversarial	strategy.	We	will	appraise	
this	contextually	in	the	cases	of	the	PP	in	Spain	and	the	Conservatives	in	the	UK.	
	
Analysing	Spain	and	the	UK	
In	the	Spanish	case,	the	constitution	shows	a	dominance	of	a	mononational	view	of	the	state	but	also	a	
significant	degree	of	ambiguity.	 This	 leaves	 room	 to	multiple	 interpretations	of	 the	national	question.	
The	 PP	 Government's	 legal	 argument	 is	 based	 upon	 the	 idea	 of	 Spain	 as	 an	 'indivisible	 nation',	 and	
implicitly,	a	lack	of	recognition	of	any	distinct	nations	existing	within	the	Spanish	territory.	
The	1978	Spanish	constitution	declares	‘the	Spanish	people’	as	the	subject	of	sovereignty	‘from	
whom	all	state	powers	emanate’	(Article	1.2).	 It	also	establishes	that	 ‘the	Constitution	 is	based	on	the	
indissoluble	unity	of	the	Spanish	Nation,	the	common	and	indivisible	homeland	of	all	Spaniards’	(Article	
2).	Minority	nations	in	Spain	can	be	seen	as	‘nationalities’	but	not	nations,	as	Spain	as	a	whole	is	the	only	
nation.	The	dominance	of	the	majority	national	group	is	also	reflected	in	the	linguistic	issue,	a	politically	
sensitive	matter	in	Spain,	as	Article	3.1	declares	Castilian	the	only	official	language	throughout	the	state,	
which	all	Spaniards	have	the	duty	to	know.	Catalonia’s	position	in	terms	of	symbolic	recognition	is	thus	
very	different	 than	 that	of	 Scotland.	 For,	 despite	 the	 lack	of	 a	 single,	 codified	 constitution,	 Scotland's	
acceptance	as	a	nation	within	the	UK	has	never	been	in	serious	doubt	(Harvey,	2017:	152).	Indeed,	the	
most	 recent	 Scotland	 Act	 (2016)	 established	 –	 for	 the	 first	 time	 –	 the	 permanence	 of	 the	 Scottish	
Parliament	as	an	institution	within	the	UK	constitutional	framework.		
There	 is	 however	 a	 significant	 degree	 of	 ambiguity	 in	 the	 Spanish	 constitution.	 Although	 the	
constitution	 does	 not	 declare	 Spain	 to	 be	 a	 plurinational	 state,	 the	 reference	 to	 the	 right	 to	 self-
government	for	‘the	nationalities	and	regions	of	which	[Spain]	is	composed’	could	be	interpreted	as	the	
signal	of	a	source	of	authority	that	precedes	the	constitution	(Martínez-Herrera	and	Miley,	2010:	8).	This	
interpretation	could	be	supported	by	the	fact	that	the	Catalan	Generalitat	was	re-established	before	the	
passing	 of	 the	 Spanish	 Constitution,	 thus	 creating	 a	 link	 to	 Catalonia’s	 distinctive	 constitutional	 past.	
There	are	also	 references	 in	 the	Spanish	 constitution	 to	 the	 ‘peoples’	of	 Spain	 in	 some	passages,	 and	
there	are	calls	to	respect	and	protect	Spain’s	cultural	richness	in	the	Preamble	and	in	Article	3.	Finally,	
many	expected	 that	 the	distinction	between	 ‘nationalities’	 and	 ‘regions’	would	 result	 in	 asymmetrical	
federal	 decentralisation	 that	 would	 de	 facto	 grant	 national	 recognition	 to	 minority	 nations	 (Tierney	
2004).	The	ambivalence	of	 the	constitutional	precepts	 reflects	both	 the	general	willingness	 to	 reach	a	
compromise	after	Franco’s	Dictatorship	and	the	competing	views	of	the	constitutional	committee	over	
nationhood	 and	 sovereignty.	 The	 disagreement	 about	 whether	 Spain	 contains	 one	 or	 more	 nations	
remains	 unsolved,	 and	national	 recognition	has	 arguably	 been	 the	main	 historical	 demand	of	 Catalan	
nationalism.	
In	a	recent	report,	the	Institute	of	Autonomic	Studies	of	Barcelona,	a	research	institute	linked	to	
the	 Catalan	 Government,	 highlighted	 five	 different	 procedures	 through	which	 Catalonia	 could	 hold	 a	
referendum	on	 its	 constitutional	 future.	The	 first	 is	 to	base	 it	on	 the	Catalan	statute	on	 referendums;	
this	would	allow	the	referendum	to	be	designed	and	organised	 in	Catalonia,	with	the	authorisation	of	
the	central	Government.	The	second	is	to	use	the	procedure	for	consultative	referendums	in	Art.	92	of	
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the	Constitution;	in	this	case	it	would	be	held	and	at	least	minimally	designed	by	the	central	institutions.	
The	 third	 would	 be	 the	 constitutional	 mechanism	 for	 the	 transfer	 of	 competences	 to	 the	 Catalan	
institutions	of	self-government,	so	that	they	would	have	competence	to	either	hold	or	hold	and	design	
the	referendum	(Art.150).	The	fourth	would	be	to	use	a	statute	on	‘consultations’	of	citizens,	which	was	
submitted	to	the	Catalan	parliament	as	part	of	the	new	process,	where	the	consultation	could	be	fully	
designed	and	organised	by	 the	Catalan	authorities.	The	 fifth	and	 final	mechanism	would	be	 to	 reform	
the	 Constitution	 to	 include	 consultative	 referendums	 for	 AC’s.	 The	 report	 then	 recommends	 that	 the	
Catalan	authorities	negotiate	with	the	central	ones	to	determine	which	of	these	procedures	is	the	most	
adequate.	
There	is	a	clear	distinction	to	be	made	in	the	differing	terminology	employed	in	each	case.	The	
UK's	 argument	 with	 regards	 to	 Scotland	 is	 more	 nuanced	 –	 it	 accepts	 the	 principle	 of	 Scotland	 as	 a	
nation,	and	broadly	accepts	its	right	to	self-determination,	though	not	without	caveats.	This	is	not	a	new	
circumstance	 –	 previous	 Conservative	 Prime	 Ministers	 Margaret	 Thatcher	 and	 John	 Major	 accepted	
Scotland	 could	 secede	 from	 the	Union	 (Keating	 and	McEwen,	 2017:	 9).	 Indeed,	 there	 has	 even	 been	
acceptance	that	Scotland	could	be	a	successful	 independent	country	from	UK-wide	politicians	opposed	
to	independence.	The	argument	made	is	that	it	shouldn’t	want	to.	Much	of	the	‘Unionist’	argument	has	
focused	upon	the	idea	of	the	UK	as	a	‘Union	of	Nations’,	of	Britishness	as	an	overarching	identity,	with	
Scottish,	 Welsh	 or	 English	 identities	 not	 inconsistent	 with	 the	 idea.	 Multiple	 national	 identities	 are	
unproblematic	 for	 the	UK	 state,	which	 is	happy	 to	 incorporate	and	accommodate	 these	attitudes	 if	 it	
helps	 to	maintain	 the	Union.	This	appeal	 to	unionism	 is,	 in	contrast	with	 the	Spanish	case,	not	a	 legal	
argument	but	much	more	of	an	appeal	 to	emotional	and	historic	 ties	 that	bind	the	nations	within	the	
state.	 The	 argument	 points	 to	 the	 fact	 that	 there	 is	 no	 constitutional	 barrier	 to	 secession,	 and	
constitutional	change	can	–	and	has	–	occurred	in	order	to	facilitate	the	possibility.	This	factors	into	the	
type	of	constitution	apparent	(as	outlined	below)	but	also	speaks	to	a	different	perception	of	the	state,	
influenced	by	 the	 different	 approaches	 to	mononationalism	 and	plurinationalism	outlined	 above.	 The	
Spanish	 government,	 by	 contrast,	 falls	 back	 upon	 the	 intransigence	 of	 the	 constitution	 on	 the	 issue,	
providing	a	legal	defence	for	a	political	position.		
Control	over	constitutional	matters	remains	a	reserved	competence	in	both	cases.	Nevertheless,	
the	UK	government	ceded	temporary	control	over	the	issue	to	the	Scottish	Parliament	in	2014	to	allow	
for	 the	 independence	 referendum	 to	 occur.	 Theresa	May,	 as	 well	 as	 Secretary	 of	 State	 for	 Scotland	
David	Mundell,	have	 indicated	 that	 they	would	be	amenable	 to	doing	 so	again	 in	 the	 future,	but	 that	
'now	 is	 not	 the	 time'	 for	 such	 a	 referendum	 (Johnson,	 2017).	 In	 short,	 while	 sovereignty	 and	 the	
competence	over	the	constitution	itself	remains	at	Westminster,	we	have	seen	that	sovereignty	shared	
in	 the	past	and	may	do	again	 in	 the	 future	–	albeit	at	 the	discretion	of	 the	UK	government.	This	 is	an	
important	point,	because	it	emphasises	the	fact	that	the	flexibility	of	the	constitution	only	plays	a	partial	
role	in	allowing	for	such	shared	competence.	The	UK’s	reliance	on	precedent	and	convention,	and	its	use	
of	referendums	in	an	ad	hoc	manner	–	most	often	when	it	was	perceived	to	be	 in	the	 interests	of	the	
government	–	mean	that	the	UK	government’s	commitment	to	allowing	the	component	nations	of	the	
UK	 the	opportunity	 to	 claim	 their	 self-determination	 is	 not	 an	 intrinsic	part	of	 the	 constitution,	 but	 a	
position	 arrived	 at	 to	 achieve	 the	maximum	possible	 political	 leverage.	 As	 noted	 above,	 a	 Section	 30	
order	that	gave	the	Scottish	Parliament	the	temporary	power	to	hold	a	referendum	was,	essentially,	a	
change	to	the	constitutional	competences	of	the	institution.		Similarly,	while	the	Spanish	constitution	is	
more	rigid,	and	interpretation	of	the	relevant	sections	appears	to	preclude	a	Catalan	referendum,	there	
are	options	to	alter	this	–	albeit	through	a	process	that	is	complicated	and	potentially	lengthy	–	thus,	the	
design	 of	 the	 constitution	 itself	 and	 the	 legal	 appeals	 to	 it	 suggest	 that	 constitutional	 design	 is	 an	
insufficient	factor	in	explaining	the	divergence	in	reactions	to	these	demands.	
This	point	shows	the	significance	of	party	politics	in	understanding	the	different	answers	given	
by	 the	 two	 governments.	 The	 PP	 and	 the	 Conservative	 party	 are	 both	 centre-right	 state-wide	 parties	
	 	 	
	
	 11	 	
	
which	 are	 electorally	 unsuccessful	 in	 the	minority	 nation,	 as	 evidenced	 by	 their	 share	 of	 the	 vote	 in	
regional	 and	 state	 elections	 as	 opposed	 to	 their	 electoral	 performance	 in	 the	 rest	 of	 the	 state.	 The	
Catalan	 branch	 of	 the	 PP,	 the	 Catalan	 Popular	 Party	 (PPC),	 has	 become	 a	 marginal	 party	 in	 Catalan	
politics	as	Ciutadans	(Citizens)	has	overtaken	their	role	as	the	party	defending	the	unity	of	Spain	and	the	
constitutional	order,	at	 least	 in	Catalan	elections.	As	the	PPC	competes	with	Ciutadans	 for	the	Catalan	
unionist	 political	 space,	 rather	 than	 with	 regionalist	 parties,	 the	 PP	 does	 not	 risk	 incurring	 in	 severe	
electoral	 losses	 by	 adopting	 a	 rigid	 stance	 on	 the	 demand	 for	 a	 Catalan	 independence	 referendum.	
Indeed,	 should	 the	PP	be	willing	 to	address	 the	demand	 for	a	Catalan	 independence	 referendum,	 the	
party	would	face	severe	electoral	competition	from	Ciutadans	at	the	Catalan	 level	and	from	this	party	
and	 the	 PSOE	 at	 the	 Spanish	 level.	 These	 parties	 would	 present	 the	 move	 as	 a	 ‘concession’	 to	 the	
separatists,	and	the	PP	would	probably	experience	a	loss	of	votes	as	the	party’s	core	voters	would	feel	
that	 the	party	 leadership	 is	 sacrificing	 the	party’s	 ideology.	Thus,	on	 this	 issue	 the	PP	does	not	 face	a	
tension	between	ideological	purity	and	marginal	vote-seeking	(Toubeau	and	Massetti	2003,	p.	306).	 In	
short,	party	ideology	and	vote-seeking	calculations	incentivise	the	PP	to	maintain	their	uncompromising	
position	 on	 the	matter,	 while	 the	 constitutional	 design	 provide	 a	 further	 constraint	 and	 a	 discursive	
justification	for	their	position.	
The	behaviour	of	the	Conservative	party	can	be	contextualised	in	a	similar	but	slightly	different	
way.	 The	 historic	 decline	 of	 the	 Scottish	 party	 left	 them	with	 no	MPs	 in	 Scotland	 in	 1997	 (and	 have	
returned	 only	 a	 solitary	 Scottish	MP	 in	 each	 of	 the	 elections	 since).	 	 Devolution,	with	 a	 proportional	
electoral	system,	allowed	for	some	recovery,	but	it	was	only	with	the	Scottish	Parliamentary	election	in	
2016	that	the	party	returned	to	significant	strength,	overtaking	Labour	as	the	second	party	to	the	SNP.	
To	 this	end,	 the	party's	 strategy	with	 regards	 to	party	 competition	cannot	be	explained	by	a	 sense	of	
being	 threatened	 by	 the	 regionalist	 party.	 Rather,	 both	 current	 Scottish	 Conservative	 leader	 Ruth	
Davidson	and	UK	Prime	Minister	Theresa	May	have	sought	to	burnish	the	party's	Unionist	credentials	in	
Scotland	by	establishing	the	party	as	its	primary	defenders.		The	UK	Government	has	thus	attempted	to	
accommodate	 demands	 where	 they	 believe	 that	 accommodation	 will	 have	 limited	 impact	 upon	 the	
constitutional	 future	of	 the	UK	but	have	taken	an	adversarial	position	 in	relation	to	 issues	where	they	
consider	the	Union	threatened.		In	this	manner,	they	have	conceded	the	'regionalist'	agenda	to	the	SNP	
and	focused	their	electoral	energies	on	the	other	significant	block	of	Scottish	voters	–	the	majority	that	
voted	in	favour	of	remaining	in	the	UK	in	2014	–	and	outflanked	Labour	on	the	issue.	
What	has	also	been	clear	–	to	this	point	–	is	that	the	pro-independence	actors	in	Scotland	have	
been	willing	to	engage	 in	the	process,	and	 'play	by	the	rules'	established	by	the	sovereignty	of	the	UK	
government	in	the	matter.	They	have	not	threatened	to	hold	a	referendum	without	the	consent	of	the	
UK	government,	and	have	been	willing	to	enter	discussions	to	achieve	this	end,	allowing	both	sides	to	
maintain	 a	 diplomatic	 position.	 By	 contrast,	 the	 strict	 legal	 position	 in	 Spain	 appears	 to	 disallow	 any	
discussion	 over	 the	 issue,	 and	 the	 Catalan	 pro-independence	 actors	 have	 moved	 to	 a	 more	 radical	
position,	which	 has	 been	 escalated	 by	 the	 Spanish	 government's	 intransigence	 on	 the	 issue	–	 itself	 a	
position	 entrenched	 by	 the	 constitution.	 As	 a	 result,	 numerous	 court	 cases	 have	 occurred,	 Catalan	
politicians	have	been	prosecuted	for	their	role	in	the	'participation	process'	and	the	issue	remains	a	live	
one.	The	question	arises	now	as	to	whether	Catalonia	will	be	able	to	hold	a	legal	referendum	–	with	the	
agreement	of	the	Spanish	government	–	if	it	is	not	preceded	by	some	form	of	constitutional	reform.		
	Lastly,	 public	 opinion	 also	 appears	 to	 play	 a	 role	 in	 the	 decision-making	 process	 for	 each	
government.	 	 In	 the	UK	case,	prior	 to	 the	2014	vote,	 there	was	widespread	acceptance	across	 the	UK	
that	 Scotland	 should	be	able	 to	hold	 a	 referendum.	By	2015,	 the	majority	 view	 (51%)	 in	 England	and	
Wales	was	 that	 the	UK	Government	should	block	a	second	 independence	referendum	 if	 it	were	 to	be	
requested	 before	 2020	 (What	 Scotland	 Thinks,	 2015).	 In	 Catalonia,	 support	 for	 the	 right	 to	 hold	 a	
referendum	 amounts	 to	 around	 four-fifths	 of	 the	 electorate,	 while	 opinion	 in	 the	 rest	 of	 Spain	
constitutes	a	majority	(65%-35%)	against	allowing	a	referendum.	In	both	cases	then,	it	appears	that	the	
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actions	of	the	central	government	are	in	tune	with	the	majority	of	the	population	that	they	represent.	
This	has	important	electoral	considerations	at	regional	and	national	level.	 	Broadly,	those	who	support	
the	unity	of	the	state	are	 likely	to	support	the	government	 in	their	position,	while	those	who	are	pro-
secession	are	unlikely	to	do	so.		What	this	amounts	to	in	practice	is	an	added	constraint	for	the	Spanish	
government,	since	the	unity	of	the	Spanish	nation	appears	to	retain	some	salience	in	elections,	whereas	
in	UK-wide	elections,	this	appears	to	be	less	of	an	issue.	However,	as	a	caveat	here,	the	potential	for	a	
Labour-SNP	coalition	in	the	aftermath	of	the	2015	UK	General	Election	did	appear	to	do	some	damage	to	
Ed	Miliband’s	chances	of	becoming	Prime	Minister.	And	in	the	Scottish	Parliamentary	election	of	2016,	
the	Conservative	party	replaced	Labour	as	the	main	opposition	party,	campaigning	on	a	clear	platform	
as	the	principle	party	in	support	of	the	Union.		
	
Conclusion	
This	article	sought	to	explain	the	differing	responses	of	the	UK	and	Spanish	governments	to	the	similar	
demands	for	referendums	on	secession	placed	upon	them	by	Scotland	and	Catalonia	respectively.	 	We	
challenged	 the	 popularity	 of	 the	 claim	 that	 these	 responses	 are	 the	 result	 of	 the	 rigid	 Spanish	
constitutional	 setting	 compared	 with	 the	 flexibility	 of	 the	 UK	 constitution,	 suggesting	 that	 this	 legal	
consideration	is	not	sufficient	to	explain	the	differences	in	the	cases.		Rather,	we	claim	that	the	different	
political	 interpretations	 of	 state	 and	 nation,	 party	 political	 considerations	 and	 public	 opinion	 have	
played	a	role	in	shaping	the	position	of	the	central	government	in	responding	to	these	demands.			
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